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The Achille Lauro Incident And The
Permissible Use Of Force
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 7, 1985, the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro was
commandeered by four individuals identifying themselves as members
of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a breakaway faction of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).' The hijacking occurred
as the Achille Lauro drew close to Port Said, Egypt, on a short excur-
sion from Alexandria 2 carrying approximately four hundred crew
members and guests. 3 Among the passengers were fourteen citizens
of the United States who were singled out by the hijackers as those
who would be the first to die if the hijackers' conditions were not
met.4 As their principal demand, the four gunmen sought the release
of fifty Palestinians from Israeli prisons, among them convicted
terrorists.5
After the hijackers had diverted the ship's course away from
Egypt and towards Tartus, Syria, a radio message was received infer-
ring that a person on board the ship had been killed.6 After the hi-
jackers had surrendered to a representative of the PLO at Port Said,
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at A1, col. 6. The PLF has been identified as one of the
eight factions originally constituting the Palestinian Liberation Organization. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at A9, col. 2. However, the PLF has distinguished itself as a particularly
brutal band of terrorists, with a reputation gained in large measure by the Nahiariga incident,
during which members of the PLF killed a five-year old Israeli girl by dashing her head against
a rock. See id., at A4, col. 5.
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 34.
3. N.Y, Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 35.
4. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Accounts later given to the press by the
passengers asserted that fourteen American, six British and two Austrian passengers were seg-
regated from the remainder of those on board the ship. Apparently, the two Austrian passen-
gers were held with the Americans because the hijackers mistakenly believed them to be
Jewish. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 35.
5. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 35,
TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 32; N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at A4, col. 4.
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The transcript of radio communications
between the hijackers and the Syrian port of Tartus was as follows: "We will start killing at
1500. We cannot wait any longer. We will start killing. What are the developments, Tar-
tus? We will kill the second. We are losing patience." N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at AI, col.
5.
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Egypt,7 the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, a wheelchair-bound United
States citizen, was confirmed by Bettino Craxi, Prime Minister of It-
aly, during a news conference in Rome" Pursuant to a settlement,
the hijackers returned the ship to Egypt in response to a promise to
provide them safe passage out of Egypt to an undisclosed location.
However, according to Egyptian officials, the gunmen were not to be
released until it was determined whether anyone on board the ship
had been killed.9 Meanwhile, the United States had requested that
Egypt extradite the hijackers to the United States.'0
On October 10, 1985, after ignoring American pleas to prosecute
or extradite the gunmen, the Egyptian government placed the hijack-
ers on a commercial airliner out of Cairo bound for the Palestinian
Liberation Organization base in Tunis, Tunisia."I The EgyptAir air-
liner was intercepted by fighter jets from the United States aircraft
carrier Saratoga over international waters north of Egypt 2 and di-
verted to Sicily, Italy, where the hijackers were arrested by Italian
authorities.13 Later, it was learned that the Tunisian government had
refused landing rights to the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers.
14
Soon thereafter, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek charged that
the use of force by the United States constituted a breach of interna-
tional law.15 This Comment will address whether the use of force by
the United States was justified as a legitimate act of self-defense or
reprisal - an act that would have been unnecessary had Egypt com-
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 33, establish-
ing that on Oct. 10, 1985, the ambassador from the United States to Egypt confirmed that
Leon Klinghoffer had been killed on board the ship. See also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at
34.
9. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6. However, there was speculation in the press
regarding actual knowledge held by Egyptian officials concerning Mr. Klinghoffer's death,
despite Egyptian claims to the contrary. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A34, col. 1. On
October 9, 1985, Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister of Italy, stated that Italy had agreed to
the settlement on the sole condition that no one on board the ship had been killed. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 3; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25.
11. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
12. Id.; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25.
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
14. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25. Additionally, the EgyptAir airliner was also de-
nied landing rights at Athens, Greece. Id.
15. President Mubarek was quoted as accusing the United States of "an act of air piracy
... unheard of under any international law or code." N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at A], col. 5.
President Mubarek also requested an apology of President Reagan, to which Mr. Reagan re-
sponded, "Never". TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 26.
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plied with principles of international law to which Egypt had volunta-
rily bound itself. The thesis of this Comment is that the use of force
against Egypt constituted a legitimate reprisal in that the action com-
plied with standards of reasonableness - a reasonableness that may
be quantified by the following three elements:
(1) Egypt was guilty of a prior international delinquency against
the United States;
(2) An attempt by the United States to obtain redress or protec-
tion by other means was known to have been made, or was
inappropriate or impossible under the circumstances, leaving
the United States without a remedy against Egypt;
(3) The use of force by the United States was limited to the neces-
sities of the case and proportional to the wrong perpetrated
by Egypt. 16
II. THE GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter contains the "basic
rule against the threat or use of force."' 7 This provision states that
"[a]ll Members shall refrain in their... use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' It is
this basic principle that underlies Egypt's complaint against the
United States.
The nationality of the airliner carrying the Achille Lauro hijack-
ers is a basis for finding that the United States' actions constituted the
use of force against Egypt's territorial integrity. 19 The Convention on
International Civil Aviation,2o to which Egypt and the United States
are parties, 2' provides that "[a]ircraft used in military, customs and
16. Professor D. W. Bowett suggests this three part test in Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972). See also Falk, The Beirut Raid and
the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 430-31 (1969).
17. Schachter, Self-Help in the International Law: U.S. Action in the Iranian Hostages
Crisis, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 231, 241 n.10 (1984).
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The U.N. Charter also requires that "[a]ll Members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
19. The assertion that the United States' action constituted a violation of Egypt's sover-
eignty is supported by the fact that EgyptAir is the Egyptian national airline. NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 21, 1985, at 22.
20. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
21. Id.
.1987]
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police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft." 22Furthermore,
under the Convention on Civil Aviation, the airliner constituted the
territory of Egypt because aircraft hold the nationality of the state
where they are registered.
23
Besides the nationality of the aircraft, the threat or use of force
against Egyptian personnel operating the plane24 and Egyptian police-
men on board the flight 25 violated Egyptian sovereignty.26 Thus,
whether analyzing the interception of the airliner as an attack upon
Egyptian property or Egyptian lives, the United States' actions consti-
tuted a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of Egypt.
III. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-DEFENSE
A. Traditional Self-Defense
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter establishes that
"[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. ' 27 Self-
defense is so basic to the existence of nations that it warrants the label
of an "inherent right."'28 The Charter does not create the "inherent
right" to self-defense, but rather recognizes it.29
Justifying the actions of the United States in the Achille Lauro
incident as legitimate instances of self-defense not only demands find-
ing that an attack upon the United States occurred, but also that the
measures taken in self-defense were necessary and proportional to the
provoking injury.30 The taking of United States citizens as hostages
and the subsequent murder of Mr. Klinghoffer is an attack upon the
United States itself, particularly if "the nationals are attacked because
22. Id. art. 3(b).
23. Id. art. 17; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 29 comment a (1965). It is assumed herein that the EgyptAir airliner is
registered in Egypt.
24. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6; see also TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 23.
25. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
26. See D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (1958). "It has been
contended that an injury to the nationals of a state constitutes an injury to the state itself." Id.
at 92.
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 1.
28. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 344
(3d ed. 1969). Former United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson has noted that the right
of self-defense is inherent "in the very existence of nationhood." Id. at 344 n.188.
29. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 28, at 344.
30. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1635,
1637 (1984).
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of political antagonism to their government."' 3' Indeed,
[i]t has been contended that an injury to the nationals of a state
constitutes an injury to the state itself, and that the protection of
nationals is an essential function of the state. On this reasoning, it
is feasible to argue that the defense of nationals, whether within or
without the territorial jurisdiction of the state, is in effect the de-
fense of the state itself.
32
However, to properly invoke the doctrine of self-defense, either
the lives of citizens must be in imminent danger or an attack upon
territorial sovereignty must be underway. 33 Reflection upon the res-
cue action of the Israeli government at Entebbe, Uganda serves as a
useful comparative device in concluding that the actions of the United
States in the Achille Lauro incident were not in self-defense, precisely
because an imminent threat of loss of life was missing. In the Entebbe
rescue mission, Israel intruded upon the territorial sovereignty of
Uganda in response to the threat of imminent loss of life of Israeli
nationals. 34 The use of force was justified in that case by the United
States' representative to the United Nations as follows:
[T]here is a well-established right to use limited force for the pro-
tection of one's own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or
death in a situation where the state in whose territory they are lo-
cated either is unwilling or unable to protect them. The right,
flowing from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of force
as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals
from injury.3
5
In the Achille Lauro case, the doctrine of self-defense cannot ad-
equately justify the actions of the United States. When the EgyptAir
airliner was intercepted by United States warplanes, the hostages, and
31. Id. at 1632. "The right of the state to intervene by the use or threat of force for the
protection of its nationals suffering injuries within the territory of another state is generally
admitted, both in the writings of jurists and in the practice of states." D. BOWErF, supra note
26, at 87. The facts of the Achille Lauro hijacking establish beyond doubt that Mr. Klinghof-
fer and other American citizens were segregated from the other passengers and crew because
of their nationality. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 34.
32. D. BOWETT, supra note 26, at 92.
33. Schachter, supra note 17, at 243; see also Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics
in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15-17 (1982).
34. Schachter, supra note 30, at 1630; see also Sheehan, The Entebbe Raid: The Principle
of Self-Help in International Law as Justification for State Use of Armed Force, 2 THE
FLETCHER F. 135 (1977).
35. Schachter, supra note 30, at 1630 (quoting DIG. OF U.S. PRAC. IN INT'L L. 150-51
(1976)).
1987]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
Mr. Klinghoffer in particular, were well beyond protection and no
longer in need of defense from the hijackers.3 6 The right of self-de-
fense, when used to justify an incursion upon the territorial integrity
or sovereignty of a State is limited to cases of "immediate threat of
irreparable injury to . . . life or property. '37 In the Achille Lauro
case, the United States' actions were not self-defensive in character
because the elements of immediate threat and irreparable injury were
absent. Certainly, United States citizens were not immediately in
need of rescue or protection when the United States acted. Accord-
ingly, the armed intervention was not "justified by the sheer necessity
of instant actions to save the lives of innocent nationals, whom the
local government is unable or unwilling to protect."
38
B. Anticipatory Self-defense
The right of self-defense has been read narrowly to apply only
when an armed attack is actually in progress. 39 The United Nations
has refused to recognize a right of preventative or anticipatory self-
defense "for fear that it may be too fraught with danger for the basic
policy of peace and stability."''4
However, particularly in the nuclear age, "[s]tates faced with a
perceived danger of immediate attack,. . . cannot be expected to await
the attack like sitting ducks."'4 Within the context of terrorism, par-
ticularly as applied in the Middle East:
When a government treats an isolated incident of armed attack as a
ground for retaliation with force, the action can only be justified as
self-defense when it can be reasonably regarded as a defense
against a new attack. Thus, "defensive retaliation" may be justified
when a state has good reason to expect a series of attacks from the
same source and such retaliation serves as a deterrent or protective
action.
4 2
The right of anticipatory self-defense may be applicable to the
36. By the time the United States planes intercepted the EgyptAir airliner, Mr. Klinghof-
fer was already dead. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Additionally, all of the
hostages had already been released. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
37. D. BOWETT, supra note 26, at 89.
38. Schachter, supra note 30, at 1630 (quoting Waldock, General Course on Public Inter-
national Law, 106 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 240 (1962)).
39. Levenfeld, supra note 33, at 15.
40. Id. at 16 (quoting R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 203 (1963)).
41. Schachter, supra note 30, at 1634.
42. Id. at 1638.
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Achille Lauro incident only if the threat of danger posed by the hi-
jackers, assisted by Egypt, was imminent. In what "is often cited as
authoritative customary law" 43  United States Secretary of State
Daniel Webster refuted a British claim of anticipatory self-defense,
asserting that anticipatory self-defense is limited to cases in which
"the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and ...
leaves no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 44
In the Achille Lauro incident, anticipatory self-defense as a justi-
fication for the United States' actions must fail because the dangers
posed by the hijackers were not imminent. A comparison to Israel's
bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, which Israel attempted
to justify as anticipatory self-defense, is helpful to an analysis of the
Achille Lauro case. In the former case, Israel's claim of anticipatory
self-defense was rejected by the United Nations because the antici-
pated Iraqi attack was not imminent. 4 5 Similarly, in the Achille
Lauro incident, while it may have been reasonable for the government
of the United States to presume the same four hijackers would return
to terrorism, the reaction of the United States was not in response to
an imminent danger. Thus, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
does not justify the American actions.
IV. REPRISAL AS A LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE
The primary distinction between acts of self-defense and acts of
reprisal is that "[s]elf-defense is future-oriented. It seeks to secure the
state against threats to its territory or sovereignty. Reprisals are past-
oriented. They seek to punish past behavior with the aim of prevent-
ing its recurrence. '46 There is a further distinction between reprisals
which are simply punitive in character, and thus illegitimate, and re-
prisals holding characteristics of reasonableness, which serve to legiti-
mize the action taken. 47  The following three elements provide an
43. Id. at 1635.
44. Levenfeld, supra note 33, at 28 (quoting 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 412-14 (1906)). The Caroline case involved the use of British armed forces against a
vessel carrying armed men to Canada. The men were on their way to support an armed insur-
rection in Canada against the British. The primary justification by the British for their actions
was the right of anticipatory self-defense. Id. at 28 n.92.
45. See Schachter, supra note 30, at 1635.
46. Levenfeld, supra note 33, at 37.
47. Bowett, supra note 16, at 11. Professor Bowett's contention, that reasonable conduct
amounting to a reprisal is not illegal, is based upon his observation that reprisals conforming to
the three factors set forth in the text at page 3 have not been condemned by the U.N. Security
Council. Id.
1987]
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analytical basis for examining and judging reprisals. These standards
of evaluation are set forth below, within the context of the Achille
Lauro incident.
A. "The target state must be guilty of a prior international
delinquency against the claimant state. ",48
"The first prerequisite, sine qua non for the right to exercise re-
prisals is an occasion furnished by a previous act contrary to interna-
tional law."' 49 In the Achille Lauro case, for the United States to
justify its actions as legitimate reprisals, the force utilized must have
been in response to a breach of international law by Egypt.
The breach at issue here was Egypt's failure to comply with the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages
Convention"), to which both Egypt and the United States are par-
ties. 50 "The basic thrust of the Hostages Convention is that those
who take hostages will be subject to prosecution or extradition if they
are apprehended within the jurisdiction of a state party to the Con-
vention. Safe haven is to be denied by the application of the principle
aut dedere aut judicare [to extradite or prosecute], which obligates
states to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender. ' 51 As initially
proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the offense of hostage-
taking is best defined as "the holding of A to obtain concessions from
48. Id. at 3; see also Falk, supra note 16, at 431.
49. Naulilaa Incident Arbitration (Port. v. Ger.), 2 U.N. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012
(1928), quoted in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 562 (1953).
The Naulilaa incident arose when German soldiers who entered Portugal during World War I
attempted to discuss the importation of food supplies. The parties to the conversation were
incapable of effective communication due to language difficulties. The encounter culminated
in the death of three Germans and the imprisonment of two others. Germany retaliated by a
widespread attack of Portugese ports on six separate occasions, which the Germans attempted
to justify as an act in response to an international delinquency. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 561-63 (1953).
50. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). As of January 1, 1985, the following states had
signed the Hostages Convention: The Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador,
Finland, The Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Korea,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Norway, Panama, Phillipines, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Trini-
dad & Tobago, United Kingdom and the United States. See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER,
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 1840 (1985).
51. Rosenstock, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Another Inter-
national Community Step Against Terrorism, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 169 (1980). The
initial proposals for the Hostages Convention were presented by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many in September of 1976, "presumably stimulated by the Munich atrocity of 1972 and sub-
sequent kidnappings of German businessmen within and outside the Federal Republic of
Germany." Id. at 173.
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B." 52 Threats, attempts to take hostages, and acting as an accomplice
are also established as contrary to international law.
53
The most critical provision of the Hostages Convention applica-
ble to the Achille Lauro incident is as follows:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without excep-
tion whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in
its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with
the laws of that State.
54
1. Egypt's Obligations under the Hostages Convention
In the Achille Lauro incident, the perpetrators of the crime of
hostage-taking were present within Egypt's territory, a State Party to
the Hostages Convention, immediately after the surrender of the
ship.5 5 Under the Hostages Convention, Egypt's obligation to prose-
cute or extradite the alleged offenders was triggered.
56
Egypt's obligation was not conditioned upon the arguable status
of the hijackers as freedom fighters engaged in a struggle for self-de-
termination. This is clear from the outcome of proposals made during
the Hostages Convention negotiations by several countries, including
Egypt, that would have exculpated offenders if the motive for the of-
fense was grounded in a struggle for self-determination. 57 The re-
sponse of Western delegates to such proposals was that the Hostages
52. Id. at 176. The offense has also been defined as [1] "the seizure or detention of an-
other person"; [2] "the threat to kill or harm that person in order to compel a third party to
perform, or refrain from performing, a specific act." Verwey, The International Hostages Con-
vention and National Liberation Movements, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70 n.6 (1981).
53. Rosenstock, supra note 51, at 177. The taking of hostages offers to the terrorist a
"natural means of attracting and maintaining widespread attention. The greatest challenge to
the terrorist's ingenuity has been to achieve this objective without precipitating results so offen-
sive as to sacrifice the sympathy for their cause which it is hoped will be evoked in the public."
Wilder, International Terrorism and Hostage Taking: An Overview, 11 MANITOBA L.J. 367,
373-74 (1981).
54. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
55. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
57. One such proposal read, "[flor purposes of this Convention, the term 'taking of hos-
tages' shall not include any act or acts carried out in the process of national liberation against
colonial rule, racist and foreign regimes, by liberation movements recognized by the United
Nations or regional organizations." U.N. Doc. A/Ac. 188/L.5 (1977). The proposal was of-
fered by Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria and the
United Republic of Tanzania. See Verwey, supra note 52, at 73.
1987]
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Convention had nothing to do with a struggle for self-determination.
The taking of hostages was to be outlawed by the Convention as an
impermissible use of force, regardless of the justification.5 8 The even-
tual outcome of such proposals was that "the principle aut dedere aut
judicare [remained] unconditional, without any exception.
'59
However, Article 8 of the Hostages Convention materially di-
lutes the obligation of Party States to prosecute or extradite an alleged
offender by allowing states to discharge their duty by referring and
deferring any decision to their own prosecuting authorities. 60  In the
Achille Lauro case, there is no evidence of any act by Egypt that
would constitute presentment of the alleged offenders to Egypt's own
prosecutors, as required by Article 8.
The head of the PLO reportedly requested that Egypt hand over
the hijackers for trial.61 However, the PLO trial could not have taken
place because the location of the trial, Tunisia, was inaccessible. Tu-
nisia refused to allow the hijackers to land there. 62 Additionally, any
judicial action undertaken by the PLO would have been highly sus-
pect. Although the PLO has a legal code that is fifteen years old, the
only actions ever undertaken under their code have concerned the in-
ternal discipline of the PLO.63 Given the inaccessibility of Tunisia
58. Verwey, supra note 52, at 74-75. The ban on the taking of hostages is analogized by
Mr. Verwey to similar bans against the use of poisonous gas or germ warfare which are con-
trary to international law, regardless of any proffered justification. Id.
59. Id. at 76. According to Professor Verwey, the unconditional obligation to prosecute
or extradite was agreed to by the nonaligned countries only after Western delegations agreed to
include in the Preamble "a clear reference to the legitimacy of the struggle for self-determina-
tion." Verwey, supra note 52, at 87.
60. Rosenstock, supra note 51, at 181. As in the case of The Hague Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 and the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, a care-
ful reading of the Hostages Convention discloses that the Hosthges Convention "does not man-
date that the offender actually be prosecuted but merely that the case be presented to the
competent prosecuting authorities." Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft: The Hague Convention, 13 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 398 (1974); see also Abramovsky, Multilateral Conventions for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure and Interference with Aircraft: The Montreal Convention, 14
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 268 (1975).
61. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6. A senior PLO representative, Hanni el-
Hassan, stated that Yassir Arafat wanted Egypt to turn over the hijackers so that the PLO
could not only place them on trial, but also punish them according to the PLO's judicial
process. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at All, col. 1.
62. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A10,
col. 1. In addition, the PLO is not a party to the Hostages Convention and thus is not even
nominally bound by its requirements. See supra note 50.
63. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at All, col. 4.
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and the paucity of PLO judicial process and precedent, it is highly
unlikely that Egypt discharged its obligation to prosecute or extradite
the hijackers by trying to hand them over to the PLO.
Unfortunately, the Hostages Convention fails to define the term
"alleged offender" for the purpose of determining the degree of cer-
tainty that must exist before a government may detain a person for
the crime of hostage-taking. A comparison to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents ("Protected Persons
Convention") adopted by the United Nations is instructive. 64 Article
1(2) of the Protected Persons Convention defines "alleged offender"
for purposes of that convention as "a person as to whom there is suffi-
cient evidence to determine prima facie that he has committed or par-
ticipated in one or more of the crimes set forth in Article 2."'65 Given
the facts of the Achille Lauro hijacking and Egypt's own admission
that the persons in custody were "alleged offenders" within the mean-
ing of that term,66 Egypt's obligation was to proceed under the Hos-
tages Convention.
2. Obligations of the United States under
the Hostages Convention
As a party to the Hostages Convention, the United States is sub-
ject to the requirement that "[e]ach State Party shall make the of-
fences set forth in article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which
take into account the grave nature of these offences."' 67 The United
States complied by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1203 which outlaws the tak-
ing of hostages.68 The power of Congress to assert extraterritorial ju-
64. Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Protected Persons Convention].
The [Protected Persons Convention] was the model most closely followed in the elab-
oration of the Hostages Convention essentially because: (a) it was adopted by the
same body, i.e., the United Nations General Assembly, and a number of the negotia-
tors were the same; and (b) it was the most recent model and in many ways covered
the most analagous conduct.
Rosenstock, supra note 51, at 170 n.6.
65. Protected Persons Convention, supra note 64, art. 1(2).
66. Id.
67. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (West 1984) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever, whether inside or
outside the United States, seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to
continue to detain another person in order to compel a third person or a governmen-
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risdiction over the offense of hostage-taking is derived from article 5
of the Hostages Convention, which provides:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in arti-
cle 1 which are committed:
(d) with respect to a hostage who is a national of the State, if that
State considers it appropriate.
69
The assertion of jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1203 "utilizes the
well-accepted territorial, personal, and passive personality basis for
the exercise of legislative jurisdiction under international law."1
70
Under the passive personality theory, "a State has prescriptive juris-
diction over anyone anywhere who injures one of its nationals. 7 1
The protective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is
more widely accepted than the personality theory7 2 also supports leg-
islative jurisdiction over the Achille Lauro incident. It provides that
"[e]ven though all relevant acts occur outside the ordinary territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, jurisdiction is possible ... if a signifi-
cant national interest is at stake and it is not otherwise impermissible
under international law to exercise such jurisdiction. '73 Under 18
U.S.C. § 1203, extraterritorial jurisdiction under the protective princi-
ple is appropriate because a significant national interest in the form of
the health, well-being and freedom of movement of United States citi-
zens was adversely impacted. The assertion of such jurisdiction is ex-
tal organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condi-
tion for the release of the person detained, or attempts to do so, shall be punished by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(b)(1) It is not an offense under this section if the conduct required for the offense
occurred outside the United States unless -
(A) the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of the United States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or
(C) the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the Government of
the United States.
(2) It is not an offense under this section if the conduct required for the offense
occurred inside the United States, each alleged offender and each person seized or
detained are nationals of the United States, unless the governmental organization
sought to be compelled is the Government of the United States.
69. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); see also Leich, Current Developments - Four Bills
Proposed by President Reagan to Counter Terrorism, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 915, 919 (1984).
70. Leich, supra note 69, at 919.
71. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity
for Foreign Violators of International Law Under FSIA and The Act of State Doctrine, 21 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 201 (1983).
72. Id. at 207.
73. Id. at 209.
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pressly encouraged by the Hostages Convention itself.74
As discussed previously with reference to Egypt's breach of its
obligation to prosecute or extradite the hijackers, 75 the offense of hos-
tage-taking was committed in the Achille Lauro incident. The Hos-
tages Convention establishes that such an act is contrary to
international law, and expressly provides jurisdiction for Congress to
establish the acts of the hijackers as contrary to the law of the United
States.7
6
The request of the United States for extradition of the hijackers
under the Hostages Convention as implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 1203,
was ignored by Egypt. 77 Accordingly, since Egypt neither prosecuted
the hijackers nor extradited them to the United States for prosecution
under section 1203, Egypt's acts constituted a breach of international
law and the perpetration by Egypt of an international delinquency
against the United States.
B. "An attempt by the claimant state to obtain redress or protection
by other means must be known to have been made, and
failed, or to be inappropriate or impossible
in the circumstances. "78
In the Achille Lauro incident, the United States suffered two dis-
tinct harms perpetrated by two sets of wrongdoers. The first, and
most obvious, was the taking of United States citizens as hostages and
the murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. The second harm suffered by the
United States was the failure of Egypt to either prosecute or extradite
the alleged offenders. 79 However, it is questionable whether the re-
quest for extradition or prosecution could, after failure, justify the
acts of the United States against Egypt, as distinguished from acts of
force against the hijackers themselves. Any hostile act by the United
States against Egypt cannot be based solely upon the crimes of the
hijackers or failed attempts to gain redress for those crimes. This is
because Egypt did not commit the crime of hostage-taking. Instead,
Egypt breached an independent duty owed under the Hostages Con-
74. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
75. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
76. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) arts. 2, 5, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
77. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
78. Bowett, supra note 16, at 3; see also Falk, supra note 16, at 431.
79. See supra notes 1-1 and accompanying text.
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vention8 ° thereby giving rise to a claim for redress by the United
States against Egypt for that breach and that breach alone.
Such an attempt for redress was not made to the United Nations
or any other international body prior to the acts of force undertaken
by the United States. Therefore, because the United States did not
seek redress for Egypt's breach of the Hostages Convention prior to
its acts against Egypt, the actions of the United States appear to fail
prong two of the analysis.
However, an independent attempt by the United States to seek
redress against Egypt for ignoring the Hostages Convention is not
necessary if it is "inappropriate or impossible in the circumstances."',
The rationale for this exception is that "[t]he legal rules expressed in
the (U.N.) Charter and in the customary law of self-defense are...
considered as irrelevant or more precisely as conditional rules that are
not operative when a state gravely wronged by an illegal act of an-
other state has no effective remedy. ' 82 Although the United States
could have sought sanctions against Egypt for its breach, the penalty
imposed against Egypt would not have accomplished the prosecution
or extradition of the hijackers. In effect, the United States would have
been left without a remedy. Moreover, although sanctions may have
been ordered by the United Nations, such sanctions would have only
highlighted the dubious policy of defining international crimes with-
out providing an effective mechanism for obtaining an adequate
remedy.
An attempt by the United States to gain redress for Egypt's
breach of the Hostages Convention would have been futile and inade-
quate considering the egregious nature of Egypt's breach and its disas-
terous consequences upon a previously agreed upon course of
conduct. Thus, it appears that the United States can meet prong two
of the test for determining whether a reprisal is legitimate in that a
claim for redress would have been "inappropriate or impossible in the
circumstances. "83
80. See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
81. Bowett, supra note 16, at 3.
82. Schachter, supra note 17, at 244. In the view of Barry Levenfeld, attempts by Israel
to gain pacific redress against Lebanon for the attacks of Palestinian forces also are inappropri-
ate or impossible. Under Mr. Levenfeld's analysis, Israel is thus justified in violating the sover-
eignty of Lebanon in order to protect itself provided, of course, that an international
delinquency has occurred and Israeli response is in proportion to that delinquency.
83. Bowett, supra note 16, at 3.
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C. "The claimant's use of force must be limited to the necessities of
the case and proportionate to the wrong done
by the target state. "84
Inquiry into the issue of proportionality must ask whether the
immediate preceding wrong determines the degree of acceptable harm
created by the reprisal, or whether proportionality is also to be deter-
mined by assessing future action intended to be deterred.85 The dan-
ger of basing notions of proportionality upon projected events is that
it produces permissive results.8 6 In contrast, proportionality analyzed
with reference to actions that have already taken place produces a
benchmark of acceptable conduct in order to predictably assess the
reprisal.
In the Achille Lauro incident, the United States' use of force
went only so far as to threaten actual force. No shots were fired.
87
From the perspective of a past event creating a need for proportional
conduct, the acts undertaken by the United States only attempted to
accomplish the result that would have taken place had Egypt com-
plied with its treaty obligations. The acts of the United States were
proportional to the preceeding wrong because the reprisal brought the
hijackers to a country that was willing to prosecute or extradite88-
exactly that which Egypt refused to do.
It is questionable whether the acts of the United States would
have been proportional to Egypt's breach of the Hostages Convention
had the United States actually fired upon the airliner. Had the United
States fired, the use of force would have been disproportionate to the
wrong committed by Egypt. The result would no doubt have been a
loss of Egyptian lives and property. Such a result would have been
more serious than Egypt's decision to act in contravention of the Hos-
84. Bowett, supra note 16, at 3; see also Falk, supra note 16, at 431. The third prong of
this three part test was also developed in the arbitration following the Naulilaa incident. The
issue of proportionality there arose within the context of three Germans killed and two
captured by Portuguese forces. The German response constituted six separate attacks upon
Portuguese ports and facilities. This lack of proportionality culminated in the arbitrator's
award of damages against Germany. See W. BISHOP, supra note 49, at 562-63.
85. Levenfeld, supra note 33, at 39-40.
86. Id. "Unless constraints are imposed (upon relying on future oriented analyses of
proportionality), a massive attack in alleged self-defense may be justified as proportionate to
some future, nebulous threat." Id. at 41.
87. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A12, col. 1 (opening statement of news conference
given by Larry Speakes, White House Spokesman).
88. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at Al col. 6; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 25,
32.
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tages Convention, a decision that in and of itself did not result in the
loss of American lives or property.
In examining the issue of proportionality from the perspective of
future events (hopefully) deterred, one must consider the ongoing na-
ture of terrorism, "[i]ts need to create spectacular drama and influ-
ence the media; its use of violence to intimidate society beyond the
impact on individual victims; and the policy-oriented response of...
[governments] to the spectre of violence created by political ter-
rorists." 89 Although Egypt was not engaged directly in the terrorism
perpetrated upon the passengers and crew of the Achille Lauro,
Egypt did act as an accessory after the fact. Standing alone, that act
projects comfort and support to terrorists seeking state support for
their activities. To some extent, future state support of terrorism was
deterred by the United States' actions, thus lessening such support
and reducing the impact of terrorism upon all of society. Considering
that bodily harm was not incurred as a result of the actions taken by
the United States and that the impact of those actions may reduce
terrorism yet to occur, the acts of the United States were also propor-
tional to the future deterred events.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States' actions in the Achille Lauro incident were
undoubtedly an incursion upon the sovereignty of Egypt. However,
while not justifiable as an act of self-defense, the use of force in this
instance constituted a lawful act of reprisal. As discussed above, the
general prohibition against the use of force can be flexible when a
state has been injured, assuming the response is (1) to an international
delinquency; (2) made after attempts at pacific redress, unless impos-
sible or inappropriate; and (3) in proportion to the initial injury.
Some argue that allowing for exceptions to the prohibition
against the use of force encourages unprincipled action. Others re-
spond to the effect that an injured state should have a remedy of con-
sequence because:
The rules against force in the (U.N.) Charter are premised on an
effective system of collective security and eventual enforcement by
international organs. The contention is that where these condi-
tions no longer hold, it is no longer appropriate to seek to maintain
the rules against the use of force, since to do so would deprive the
89. Wilder, International Terrorism and Hostage Taking: An Overview, 11 MANITOBA
L.J. 367, 369 (citing A. MILLES, TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS 10-11 (1980)).
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injured state of an effective remedy. 90
Although this exception to the general rule against the use of force
can be used to manipulate the doctrine of reprisal in an unprincipled
manner, international law should not leave injured states without any
remedy whatsoever. Accordingly, given a prior delinquency by
Egypt, redress impossible to obtain under the circumstances, and a
reaction in proportion to the initial wrong, the actions of the United
States in the Achille Lauro incident were not contrary to international
law.
Mark D. Larsen
90. Schachter, supra note 17, at 245.

